[Seminario de microeconomía aplicada 12: Myopia and Complex Dynamic Incentives: Evidence from Medicare Part D](#)

[Calendario de actividades](#)

Universidad de Arizona

Resumen: Under the standard benefit package, Medicare Part D drug coverage provides no [illegible] after reaching the gap, providing evidence of myopia.

We structurally estimate the dynamic model using maximum likelihood. We find that, for the full sample of Part D enrollees, behavioral hazard increases enrollee spending by 44%. A counterfactual policy that closed the coverage gap in a revenue-neutral way would require 42% coinsurance.

Organizadores: Banco de la República- Cali, en asocio con el Congreso de la Asociación Colombiana de Economía de la Salud

Fecha: Jueves, 19 de febrero

Hora: 06:15 p.m.

Lugar: Fundación Valle de Lili, Auditorio Principal, Carrera 98 #18-49

- Imprimir